Lebanon is heading for a general election that is due to be held in May, even though postponement remains a possible scenario. Hezbollah’s adversaries hope to overturn the majority currently held by the loose coalition between the radical Shi’i party and its allies, including President Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. It is however highly unlikely that the election will substantially change the broader political status quo in the country and effectively tackle its structural problems.
Many problems on the table for the next election
Deeply divisive issues in Lebanese politics include foreign relations, in particular vis-à-vis the Gulf Cooperation Council member states; the status of Syrian refugees; and the abysmal condition of the economy. A recent press release by the World Bank defined the ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon as a “deliberate depression”, orchestrated by “the elite that has long ruled the country and captured the state and its associated economic rents”. The default of March 2020, caused by a combination of massive public debt and unsustainable credit lines in the banking system, led to a staggering collapse of the exchange rate of the local currency to the US dollar. In short, the crisis caused massive losses in the financial system, in government revenues, and in the purchasing power of Lebanese residents.
Lebanon’s political parties are fiercely at odds on international alignments (pro-Saudi Arabia vs pro-Iran), but strikingly similar when it comes to economic policy and alternatives to the current status quo. The notion of “sectarianism” is usually evocated in order to describe Lebanon’s peculiar system of power. It entails the allocation of major institutional positions along confessional lines, but also a patronage system that feeds corruption and clientelism. Every major political actor in the country talks about overcoming sectarianism, but what this actually means in practice is a different story. If sectarianism is understood as sharing the cake (of public resources) according to a predetermined ratio, what is actually meant in many milieus as the abolition of sectarianism is in fact a demand for bigger slices of the cake.
The lack of an alternative
As dysfunctional as it may be, Lebanon’s political arrangement has been reinforced by the negative effects of the pandemic and the lack of viable alternatives. The massive demonstrations that rocked the country in October 2019 lost their momentum amidst the adverse effects of the economic crisis unfolded by the March 2020 default, combined with the COVID-19 pandemic and the havoc wreaked on the city of Beirut by the explosion on 4 August 2020.
Anti-systemic groups and actors are also negatively affected by the characteristics of the political process. The current electoral law was passed in June 2017. It instituted a proportional representation system in fifteen constituencies while maintaining the allocation of the 128 parliamentary seats along confessional quotas. The last election, held on 6 May 2018, saw a confusing patchwork of non-ideological electoral alliances and rivalries among sectarian parties and district-based notables. Non-sectarian candidates were very negatively affected by the electoral system, and only one was elected in the outgoing chamber. Electoral turnout is typically low and calls for boycott are not unheard of. Former PM Saad Hariri announced on 24 January 2022 his intention to bow out of politics, igniting doubts on the participation of the Future Movement, until then led by Hariri, in the next election.External countries (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran) are not even disguising their involvement in Lebanese politics.
It is still possible that the current elite will opt for postponement rather than hold a potentially unfavorable election, but such a choice would further erode the legitimacy of the political system.
Helping Lebanon to keep together
Under these conditions, it seems vital to ensure that the electoral process, however flawed, is kept free and fair, with the chance for non-sectarian, anti-status quo actors to voice their criticism and field their candidates. International election observation missions can improve the chances of a secure and transparent voting process.Although international aid does support a dysfunctional political system and may feed patron-client networks, funding aimed at building or improving state capacity (particularly on sensitive issues such as customs and border control) should not be cut or crossed out.
Most economic recovery packages are based on a model of austerity and neoliberal policies. It must be ensured that the conditionality of foreign aid does not translate into the further impoverishment of the population. Due to the economic crisis, a significant number of residents are dependent on some sort of aid, including food and medicines. Austerity measures should not endanger lifelines.
The controversial rhetoric of stabilization in Syria is contradicted by anecdotal evidence provided by returnees. Measures aimed at Syrian and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, whether registered or not, should be understood as long-term policies without an end in sight. Alongside refugees and migrant workers, vulnerable communities in Lebanon should continue to be the focus of specific programs aimed at their empowerment.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Francesco Mazzucotelli is currently teaching History and Culture of the Middle East at the University of Pavia, Italy, and in the Master in Middle Eastern Studies at ASERI, Milan, Italy. His core research topic is the history of Lebanon in the late Ottoman period and in the twentieth century. He is the co-author of Guida alla politica mediorientale (Milano: Mondadori, 2021).