Israeli-Palestinian Prisoner Swaps: Lessons from Austrian Mediation in the 1980s

The ongoing negotiations regarding Israeli hostages captured on October 7, 2023, underscore the relevance of historical prisoner exchanges between Israel and Palestinian groups in terms of the lessons they provide today. The prisoner swaps of the 1980s, mediated with significant Austrian involvement, offer valuable insights into the dynamics of such exchanges. These negotiations, notable for their scale and the disproportionate ratios of prisoners exchanged, established precedents for subsequent deals. However, the release of individuals convicted of terrorism remains controversial, as some resumed leadership roles in militant activities. At the same time one of the freed Palestinians took an unexpected path, which led to participation in Israeli politics.

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel declared a large number of its soldiers missing in action. Prime Minister Menachem Begin tasked former Knesset member Arie Lova Eliav to use his contacts with the PLO to gather information about the soldiers‘ whereabouts. Eliav was a former secretary general of the Israeli Labour Party who during the 1970s had joined the emerging Israeli peace movement. Partly under the auspices of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, a proponent of dialogue with the PLO, Eliav had already met with Arafat’s emissary Issam Sartawi.,

With Begin’s agreement, Eliav reactivated his contact with Kreisky. The Austrian chancellor agreed to help out of ‚humanitarian concern‘, but also in order to foster Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Kreisky involved his friend Sartawi and entrusted his chief of cabinet, Herbert Amry, who had built an excellent network as ambassador to Lebanon, with the role of chief mediator. The chancellor himself occasionally intervened at the highest political level to establish contacts or break deadlocks. During his intensive shuttle activity, Amry established the principle of working on both sides on behalf of the prisoners‘ families, meaning he visited prisoners held by both sides.

It turned out that the missing Israeli soldiers, who were still alive, were being held by three different actors: Fatah, Syria, and the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command), the latter being part of the anti-Arafat front that rejected any compromise with Israel. Although Israel initially insisted on negotiating the fate of all soldiers in Palestinian custody as a package deal, it eventually accepted that Arafat did not have any influence over the PFLP-GC. This fact suggests that complex prisoner exchange negotiations may require pragmatic decisions in the interest of prisoner safety. In this case, it meant taking  a step-by-step approach rather than insisting on a package deal.

The First Exchange (1983)

The first major exchange occurred in late 1983. A record 4,700 prisoners held in Israel’s notorious camp in Ansar were released in return for six Israeli soldiers. Although this exchange set a record for the number of prisoners released, it did not provoke significant controversy in Israel since most of them were not convicted of terrorism. Notably, Israeli and PLO negotiators even met directly for the first time in Vienna. Nevertheless, in the end, the deal was sealed under the auspices of France and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The main reason for this may have been the assassination of Sartawi, Austria’s main PLO-contact, by the radical Abu Nidal group. In general, at the end of each mediation, the Austrians would turn the negotiations over to the ICRC to make the final arrangements for the exchange. Ultimately, Israel’s concessions were driven by the imminent threat to the prisoners, as the Syrian army closed in on PLO strongholds in Tripoli.

The Exchange with Syria (1984)

The next exchange was with Syria. Here Austria was able to make contact on a state-to-state level. Although Kreisky was known as a supporter of Arafat’s dovish endeavours, which ran counter to Syria’s interests, he enjoyed great prestige among many Arab politicians as an advocate for Palestinian rights. His reputation facilitated a trip to Damascus, where the ailing Kreisky, who had already resigned as chancellor, met with President Hafiz al-Asad and even the head of the PFLP-GC, Ahmad Jibril. In the end, Israel released all 291 detained Syrian soldiers and some 20 civilians in exchange for three Israeli soldiers.

The “Jibril Deal” (1985) 

The final exchange, negotiated with the PFLP-GC, proved the most challenging. It took months to confirm the faction’s possession of Israeli prisoners and to establish reliable communication channels. Protracted negotiations revealed three Israeli captives rather than the initially claimed two. After the exchange ratio was in principle agreed upon, the eventual exchange took place in Geneva and involved Israel releasing 1,150 prisoners, including individuals convicted of high-profile attacks. Among them were figures like Kozo Okamoto, responsible for the 1972 Lod Airport massacre (today’s Ben Gurion airport, near Tel Aviv). Other prominent convicts included Hamas founding member Ahmed Yassin, the current head of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, or Abdullah Darwish. The latter founded the Islamic Movement in Israel, whose political wing would become the first Arab party to join a government coalition.

Public reaction in Israel to the “Jibril deal” was overwhelmingly critical, with significant backlash against the already unpopular Kreisky. A planned visit to Israel was canceled out of concern for his security, and shortly afterwards Herbert Amry, the actual mediator, died under mysterious circumstances, often linked to an unrelated arms deal scandal.

Concluding Recommendations

The 1983 exchange with the PLO established a precedent for disproportionate prisoner swaps, with Palestinian groups consistently demanding high ratios due to the greater number of Palestinians in Israeli custody.

Mediators might be the first to be blamed if the swap deals face a public backlash on the domestic front. Kreisky remained bitter about the backlash he experienced in Israel.

Effective mediation requires credibility on both sides. Austria’s approach emphasized its humanitarian role, mediating on behalf of prisoners’ families on both sides rather than focusing on political interests. While Kreisky had a pro-Palestinian image, he was also of Jewish origin and had facilitated the emigration of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union via Austria. Mostly, he had a line of communication with Israeli leaders, despite questionable public outbursts.

Prisoner exchanges with terrorist groups may require the painful release of terrorists who have committed horrific acts. The release of convicted terrorists may lead to renewed militant activity, as seen with several figures from the “Jibril deal”. On the other hand, cases like Abdullah Darwish, illustrate the potential for transformation.

Finally, such negotiations are inherently complex and time-consuming. The “Jibril deal”, for example, required two and a half years of intensive efforts.

These historical experiences highlight the delicate balance between humanitarian concerns, political pressures, and long-term security risks in prisoner exchange agreements. Regarding the current situation in Gaza, they point to the need for mediation fully accepted by both sides and a strong political leadership willing to make controversial decisions out of concern for the lives of the hostages.

About the Author:

Tobias Lang is a doctoral candidate at the University of Vienna and a research affiliate at the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Resolution @tobiaslang.bsky.social