In January 2026, Switzerland assumed the OSCE chair for a third time. Originating from a request by several countries, it is an expression of confidence in Berne as a bridge builder, but also a symptom of the deep crisis the organisation is facing. Taking over the helm of the OSCE demonstrates continued dedication to multilateralism and a commitment to a European security architecture based not merely on deterrence but also on dialogue. This will place demands on Swiss diplomacy and security policy alike, but it may also represent an opportunity for both policy areas.
In 2026, Switzerland holds the chairpersonship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for a record third time after 1996 and 2014 – to this date, no other country has chaired the OSCE as often. During its first tenure in 1996, with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 2014 in the context of the escalating crisis ‘in and around Ukraine’, Berne demonstrated its ability to add value in times of profound security policy upheaval in Europe. However, the current situation is different.
The OSCE in 2026: taking stock
The context of the 2026 chairpersonship is historically and politically significant. 2025 marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, but an European peace order as such no longer exists today. China, Russia, and also the United States are increasingly thinking in terms of spheres of influence and pursuing power politics, which directly affects Europe. International law still exists, but Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, DC are increasingly selective in its application.
The OSCE and its concept of cooperative security are facing their deepest crisis since their inception. The organisation’s freedom of action is limited by structural blockages and a budget that has been frozen for years. Participating states mistrust each other. Moscow vetoes substantial decisions and political declarations. Furthermore, various Western countries are taking a decidedly ‘no business as usual’ approach towards Russia due to its revisionist and neo-imperial foreign and security policy, particularly since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the flagrant violation of the Helsinki Principles.
Unlike in 1996 and 2014, Switzerland did not actively seek the chair this time around. Instead, various countries offered it to Berne. Due to its tradition as a neutral bridge builder, Switzerland is considered one of the few countries that are still eligible for this role. At the same time, as a highly globalised, internationally connected medium-sized European state, it also has an intrinsic interest in the continued existence of a rules-based international order based on multilateralism. As Finnish President Alexander Stubb recently pointed out in a Foreign Affairs essay, diplomacy becomes increasingly transactional without a strong and functional multilateral system. When might makes right, smaller states are at a disadvantage. It is therefore in Berne’s interest to assume chairpersonship responsibilities of the world’s largest regional security organisation in 2026. It also enables Switzerland to continue to prove itself as an active security provider to its European and transatlantic partners following its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2023–24, its current presidency of the Council of Europe and its ongoing and substantial contributions to EU and NATO military peacekeeping missions in the Western Balkans.
The way forward: Political coherence through a dual strategic positioning
During 2026, a key domestic challenge for Switzerland will be to achieve coherence in the fields of foreign and security policy in order to contribute to strengthening security in Europe in both policy areas. In terms of foreign policy and diplomacy, Switzerland aims to act as a credible mediator and bridge builder. In regard to security and defence policy, it strives to intensify cooperation and interoperability with NATO and its European neighbours.
The realms of foreign, security and defence policy must be understood as complementary (not mutually competing) and be implemented as such in practice. For Switzerland, this means that consistently strengthening its own defence capabilities and deterrence is not at odds with its foreign policy role as a bridge builder – it makes the country more resilient and credible as an actor. The population – as well as partners in Europe and overseas – expect and deserve this honesty.
This implies a dual strategic positioning: internally, there needs to be clear communication that the dialogue and peace policy, traditionally uncontested by the Swiss population, is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to a modernised comprehensive foreign, security and defence policy. In the foreign policy realm, it is important to bring Switzerland’s own strengths to the table without overestimating them: bridge-building, technical expertise, moderation, process design, and procedural innovation.
Security based solely on deterrence tends to be short-sighted because it is based on worst-case scenarios and may therefore lead to misjudgments. Still, the current geopolitical situation in and around Europe also requires recognition of the fact that dialogue formats only work if they are underpinned by credible security policy concepts and robust military capabilities. Switzerland must therefore consistently contribute to European security and defence as well. At the same time, however, it is advisable to keep channels of communication with Russia open through the OSCE, without harbouring illusions about their usefulness.
Defining success: chairing the OSCE in 2026
The OSCE is severely limited in its freedom of action, and the concept of consensus-based cooperative security faces heavy criticism. But would be inappropriate to prematurely dismiss the organisation as obsolete. It’s quiet, often unspectacular instruments such as election observation, field operations, confidence- and security-building measures, and preventive diplomacy can be of considerable value in phases of political tension.
The Ukraine dossier will remain the litmus test of the 2026 chairpersonship. Moscow is not showing willingness to engage in serious peace negotiations, and military force continues to set the pace, which makes sustainable solutions unlikely in the short to medium term. But if windows of opportunity should open up, the OSCE must be ready to act, provided that Kyiv (and, for better or worse, Moscow) greenlights a mandate.
The success of the 2026 Swiss chairpersonship will hardly be measured by grand political declarations or breakthroughs, but rather by small steps: by keeping channels of communication open, by avoiding misunderstandings, and perhaps by increasing the OSCE’s ability to act through reforms. This may not be exactly spectacular, but it has the potential to be very substantial. It is also precisely where neutral states such as Austria and Switzerland, with their tradition of good offices, can bring specific added value.
Author’s description:
Lucas Renaud is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich, focusing on Swiss and international foreign, security, and defence policy. He further specialises in the geopolitics of the states of the former Soviet Union and the Western Balkans. Recent publications include a chapter on the 2026 Swiss chairpersonship of the OSCE (on which this blog is partly based) and a contribution in the Swiss military science journal stratos on the securitisation of history in Russia and prospects for peace in Ukraine.