The security policy debate is dominated by two main positions. One argues that military strength creates stable peace through deterrence. The other considers the use of force to be inherently hostile to peace and calls for consistent disarmament and civil conflict management. Both positions have convincing arguments and empirical evidence. Proponents of deterrence point to the relative stability of the Cold War, while proponents of disarmament point to the escalating dynamics of arms races. Nevertheless, both approaches fall short because they overlook a crucial factor: it is not the quantity of means of violence, nor their mere absence, that determines war or peace. What is decisive, however, is the institutional quality of the structures that control, legitimise and limit state violence.
Numerous states have functioning security apparatuses and receive international support, yet remain stuck in cycles of recurring violence and weak governance. The existence of armed forces clearly does not guarantee peace. At the same time, disbanding them would leave populations defenceless against those who wield informal means of violence. Therefore, the question is not: violence or no violence? Rather, it is: what form of institutional control over violence can ensure lasting peace?
Security sector reform as institutional transformation
The concept of security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) offers an analytical and normative framework that goes beyond the dichotomy described above. SSR refers to a political process aimed at establishing transparency, accountability, and democratic control in the security sector. It is explicitly not about technical modernisation or quantitative capacity building, but rather a qualitative transformation of governance structures. Security is understood as the exercise of force that is embedded in the rule of law and subject to accountability. Legitimacy arises from procedures, control, and democratic embedding, not from mere capacity or deterrence potential.
The analytical distinction runs along a spectrum between informal and institutionalised control over security forces. Informal control mechanisms, such as patronage networks and personal loyalty relationships, offer political elites short-term flexibility. In the long term, however, they increase the risk of repression, desertion and coup attempts. Institutionalised governance, on the other hand, makes the use of state violence predictable, contained and accountable. It reduces arbitrariness and creates the conditions for public trust. The binary opposition of violence and non-violence thus gives way to a governance-oriented perspective, in which the type and quality of control become the decisive criterion.
Legitimacy as a key category
The concept of the state’s monopoly on the use of force undergoes a normative reorientation through the SSR perspective. The crucial question is not whether a state has a monopoly on the use of force, but whether this monopoly is legitimate and bound by law. The difference between rule of law and rule by law makes it clear that legality alone is no guarantee of the legitimate use of force. Qualitative reforms of governance structures can curb institutions of force and limit their potential for abuse. Authoritarian regimes exploit legal systems to legitimise their rule, but this form of legality differs fundamentally from security guarantees that are controlled by the rule of law and democratically accountable. Its acceptance is based on a combination of professionalism, an attitude oriented towards the common good, and institutional integrity. Democratic procedures and institutional accountability are key to building trust. Technical capability alone is therefore necessary, but not sufficient.
The human security paradigm complements this perspective by shifting the analytical focus from state security to human security. The starting point is the security needs of the population, not the stability of state institutions. Good security governance means security for all equally, regardless of social status, gender or ethnicity. Against this backdrop, the thesis of democratic peace can be expanded: democratically controlled security sectors create not only interstate peace, but also internal peace.
Local ownership as a prerequisite for success
The lack of genuine local ownership is the biggest challenge for state-building interventions and explains much of their failure. Formal Western-style models of the rule of law encounter structural limitations in contexts with hybrid security arrangements. Accountability must therefore be considered beyond formal rule of law. Local communities have their own normative resources and social ties that can constitute spaces of governance. Donais and Barbak’s proposal for polycentric accountability takes this insight into account and goes beyond the simplistic dichotomy of a strong state and non-violent idealism.
Standardised reform models were often transferred virtually unchanged, even though local structures were characterised by fundamentally different practices and path dependencies. Donor programmes operating in parallel sometimes pursued contradictory approaches, which led to inconsistencies and undermined the impact of the reforms. So-called best practices often turn out to be copies of national security models from donor countries, rather than providing adaptive solutions for specific contexts. Local ownership is therefore an indispensable prerequisite for successful reform, not an optional extra.
The Sahel region illustrates the failure of an approach to capacity building that neglects governance reforms. Short-term military priorities weaken existing accountability structures rather than strengthening them. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the limitations of robust mandates without local legitimacy are becoming apparent. International peace missions may be able to curb violence in the short term, but sustainable stabilisation requires the establishment of legitimate and accountable security institutions. This is precisely where ambitious state-building mandates reach their limits: legitimacy cannot be imported.
Conclusion
On closer inspection, the dichotomy between armed peace and non-violent idealism proves to be a false alternative. The real problem lies not in the existence of security forces, but in their governance structures. SSR transforms the supposed paradox into a continuum: from uncontrolled violence, to legitimate, democratically constrained violence, to comprehensive human security. The transition is achieved through accountability, transparency, parliamentary control, and civil society participation. Those who want peace must build legitimate security structures.
As a policy recommendation, international donors should condition security assistance on verifiable governance benchmarks. Capacity-building must be accompanied by investments in parliamentary oversight and civil society monitoring, with funding tied to progress in accountability, not merely operational effectiveness. Furthermore, SSR programmes must move beyond standardized templates. Reform strategies should be co-designed with local stakeholders from the outset, incorporating hybrid security arrangements and ensuring genuine ownership, rather than externally imposed models.
This insight overcomes both the hope for non-violence and the acceptance of arms races. The path to institutionally controlled, democratically monitored, and human rights-oriented security is politically contested and protracted. But it offers the only realistic prospect of lasting peace.
About the Author:
Deniz Kocak is a Research Associate at the Helmut Schmidt University / University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg (HSU/UniBwH), where he currently works on the topics of (maritime) security governance and critical infrastructure protection. Prior to this, he worked as Senior Scientific Officer with the Department of Risk Communication and with the Unit “Crisis Prevention and Coordination”, German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, as consultant on security governance with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Timor-Leste, and as researcher with the DFG-Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 700, Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, Freie Universität Berlin.